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Abstract 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provide transparent and comparable 
country statistics for different dimensions of governance linked to 
(under)development. Yet, does the public availability of governance data actually 
enhance performance? If investors, donor agencies and citizens are made aware of 
relative governance performance, competition for inward investment, such as FDI and 
ODA, and domestic legitimacy become plausible mechanisms for diffusion of good 
governance. We test whether such mechanisms operate using the WGI for Africa, and 
find evidence for spatial diffusion of democracy, rule of law, and corruption control. 
There is no evidence for diffusion of regulatory quality and government effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
Quality of governance has become a key element in explanations for (lack of) 
development and economic growth, regime legitimacy, civil conflict and even state 
failure (North, 1990; Collier et al., 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Seldadyo, Pandu Nugroho, 
& de Haan, 2007; Bates, 2008). Improving governance is also central to efforts of the 
international community to deal with underdevelopment and post-conflict situations; 
e.g., the World Bank (WB) and the IMF have made support conditional on improved 
governance. The US Millennium Challenge Account, launched by the Bush 
administration in 2003, introduced an aid allocation mechanism based on competitive 
assessment of governance performance in developing countries (Knoll & Zloczysti, 
2012).  
 
A number of cross-national indicators of the quality of governance have been 
developed (UNDP, 2007). Prominent among these are those developed by the WB 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007; 2010): the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) provide statistics for different dimensions of perceptions of governance 
quality. A rationale for compiling and publicly distributing governance indicators is 
the belief that such information contributes to improving governance: 
 
Such findings, and the data behind them, reinforce the experiences and 
observations of reform-minded individuals in government, civil society, and 
the private sector, who know that good governance is essential for 
development. Their growing recognition of the link between good 
governance and successful development has stimulated demand for 
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monitoring the quality of governance across countries and within individual 
countries over time. (World Bank, 2007: 2). 
 
Does information about governance indicators indeed improve the quality of 
governance in ways the quote above suggests? Information matters for governance; 
countries are better governed if they have more political accountability (Adserà, Boix, 
& Payne, 2003) and transparency, providing more economic data (Islam, 2006; 
Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2014). We argue that because rulers have to 
compete for external resources, such as FDI and ODA, and political support, they 
have reasons to care about how they are perceived to govern. This does not require 
that ordinary citizens or rulers in developing countries pay close attention to the WGI, 
but they should care about how well their country is governed, and the indicators 
should reflect the perceptions of citizens, investors, and politicians.  
 
Below we outline internal or domestic competition for political legitimacy and 
external competition for flows of inward investment as plausible mechanisms linking 
the availability of indicators to better performance. The first mechanism focuses on 
comparisons of the quality of government by politicians and civil society. The second 
mechanism draws attention to increased importance of governance for decision-
makers in the private (FDI) and public (ODA) sector. Drawing on the literature on 
policy diffusion, the two mechanisms are modeled in an integrated manner as best 
responses to external and internal pressures to improve governance. Transboundary 
networks are appropriate to capture possible external pressures suggesting 
interdependence between observations, where spatial econometrics can account 
formally for such interdependencies (Anselin, 1988; Ward & Gleditsch, 2002; 
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Plümper & Neumayer, 2010).  The empirical focus in upon Africa – a key continent 
for organizations like the WB interested in governance and development.  
 
It is well known that democracy clusters geographically (Gleditsch & Ward, 2008), 
but visual inspection suggests similar patterns for the whole array of WGIs revealing 
a cluster of countries with low governance score in Central Africa (World Bank, 
2007: 4-5). Also globally, countries that are geographically nearer to each other are 
more likely to have similar WGI scores (Seldadyo et al., 2007; Seldadyo, Elhorst, & 
de Haan, 2010). There is, however, no strong theoretical explanation for clustering. It 
is possible to control for similar domestic-level structural constraints countries face if 
they are located in closer proximity. Lack of governance may also have transboundary 
effects; for example, Collier (2007: 57) argues that being surrounded by poor—and 
poorly governed—countries limits opportunities for development because it restricts 
access to markets. Moreover, refugees and internally displaced people congregate in 
border areas putting additional pressure on the governing capacity of neighboring 
states (Salehyan, 2009). Similarly, traders, soldiers and peacekeepers have contributed 
to the spread of HIV/Aids across Sub-Sahara Africa imposing additional burdens on 
the governing capacity of African states (Smallman-Raynor & Cliff, 1991). Buhaug 
and Gleditsch (2008) emphasize the importance of transnational ethnic ties for the 
spatial clustering of conflict (see also de Groot, 2011).  
 
Yet, neither structural nor transboundary factors can fully account for observable 
variation in levels and improvements of governance; for example, Tanzania and 
Botswana are seen as positive outliers in their region. The literature on governance 
also points towards lack of political leadership; van de Walle (2001) suggests neo-
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patrimonialism as a shared feature of African regimes, explaining lack of governance. 
If the quality and clustering of governance depends partly on political decisions, then 
there may be reasons for rulers to condition their provision of governance on quality 
of governance in neighboring countries. It is relevant to note that this does not mean 
that rulers necessarily care about the quality of governance in their country, or that 
they are preoccupied with relative performance for its own sake. Also, we do not have 
to assume that rulers are overly worried about WGI data and spend time trying to 
manipulate numbers. We can simply assume that they want to hold on to power and 
that they are only willing to make investments in governance as long as it provides 
them with domestic support and allows them to attract inward investment or other 
economic resources.  
 
A crucial part of our model of spatial diffusion of governance is how the position of a 
country in international networks affects the pressure on rulers to improve 
governance. If performance is higher in neighboring states, rulers lose domestic 
legitimacy because it is easier for citizens to make relevant comparisons. At a more 
abstract level, countries can be conceived as being closer in a ‘competition network’ if 
there is a greater degree of competition between them for inward investment. A 
country is under competitive pressure if it is central to this network (so it has many 
competitors) and the competitors generally have higher governance scores. Arguably, 
spatial clustering is related to the fact that information flows more freely between 
neighbors, and they are likely to be close in the competition network (Zhukov & 
Stewart, 2012). Using similar distinctions between information and competition, 
Simmons and Elkins (2004) and Cao (2012) discuss the importance of various spatial 
networks for the diffusion of policy and political institutions. We draw upon the 
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recent economics literature analyzing games played on networks (Goyal, 2007; 
Jackson, 2008), and apply this to competition between political units (Ward & John, 
2013). In their strategic interaction on networks, countries are linked by two sorts of 
ties: (i) a competition network that specifies for each pair of countries the degree to 
which mobile resources are likely to respond to performance differentials, and (ii) a 
spatial network that specifies citizens’ ability to make comparisons of their country’s 
relative performance (compare Besley & Case, 1995; Cao, 2012; Zhukov & Stewart, 
2012). Our theoretical contribution is to model these processes in an integrated 
manner and to show how they interactively condition rulers’ decisions.  
 
Our empirical contribution is to provide a unique test of the effectiveness of 
governance indicators to drive up performance. Do higher governance scores of 
countries that are close in network terms lead to improvement in performance? The 
quality of governance—as measured by the WGI compiled for Africa for the period 
1996 – 2011—provides the empirical test for our model (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The 
period is also appropriate since the quality of governance, especially as applied to 
Africa, became a serious concern for the international community (for example, the 
UN Millennium Project). We find some evidence that competition for inward 
investment and the need to ensure domestic legitimacy drive up performance, but only 
in relation to some aspects of governance, namely regarding democracy, rule of law 
and corruption control. There is however no evidence for diffusion of regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness. The next section briefly surveys existing 
literature on quality of governance with a focus on studies that consider spatial and 
network effects. Then we outline the theoretical framework formalizing internal and 
 8
external constraints. In the sections after that we elaborate on our research design and 
present the main empirical findings.  
 
The Diffusion of Governance  
It is generally acknowledged that measuring governance demands an encompassing 
view of government, including central and local political authorities as well as 
bureaucracies, and considering both their internal workings and the interaction 
between state and economic and societal actors (Overseas Development Institute, 
2006). Kaufmann et al. (2010: 4) define governance as “the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them.”  
 
The WGI have been criticized for a number of reasons; for example, Kurtz & Schrank 
(2007) and Andrews (2008) question the value of the WGI on theoretical and 
ideological grounds, and Thomas (2010) methodologically. Even though Kaufmann et 
al. (2007) provide an extensive rebuttal, we share some of the concerns about the use 
of WDI to explain phenomena such as economic development, to guide fund 
allocation or to provide policy advice (see also, Kelley & Simmons, 2015). Our 
interest in the WGI is however more limited, namely how information about the 
(relative) quality of governance may compel political leaders to improve governance.   
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There may be a number of different causal processes at work that could lead to the 
diffusion of governance practices, and indirectly WGI scores, between countries. 
Surveying hundreds of articles in the diffusion literature, Graham, Shipan, and Volden 
(2013) categorize the discussion of causal mechanisms under four headings – 
learning, competition, coercion and socialization (also see Bailey & Rom, 2004; 
Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2008). Seldadyo et al. (2010: 
626) list spillovers, resource flows, policy convergence, interdependent policy 
decisions and transmission of government forms as possible factors for spatial 
dependence. In practice it has proven very difficult to differentiate between possible 
causal mechanisms given the existing state of theory and available econometric 
techniques (Gilardi, 2010). Nevertheless we argue that it is useful to distinguish the 
following diffusion mechanisms. 
 
Norm diffusion Ideas about ‘right’ policies spread among the political elite 
through socialization in international forums. Simmons and Elkins (2004) highlight 
the relevance of communication networks for the diffusion of the norms associated 
with economic liberalization. Apart from transmitting information, norm diffusion 
takes place by way of learning via analogy with relevant reference groups: “The 
policies of culturally similar countries are perceived to (and in fact may) contain 
highly relevant information on the appropriateness of a particular policy in a specific 
context of shared values” (Simmons & Elkins 2004, 176).  
 
Regional and global intergovernmental organizations are often considered central to 
the socialization of political actors; consider, for example, the role of the United 
Nations in advancing human rights as a global norm. Specifically in relation to good 
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governance, Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2012) argue that international organizations not 
only promote governance by using integration strategies, including building networks 
between member states via workshops, conferences and negotiations, but also by 
using governance indicators like the WGI to challenge governments about the 
adequacy of their performance. Even IGOs that do not explicitly spread democracy, 
human rights and other norms relating to good governance often have this as a latent 
function, because political leaders communicate with each other informally at 
meetings. A country is more embedded in the IGO system if it is a member of more 
IGOs, and especially of those with a larger membership. More embedded countries 
are more exposed to external pressures both from the IGOs and from other members, 
but are also more influential in spreading their norms of good governance. In terms of 
network theory, such a country is more central to the IGO network (see also Dorussen 
& Ward, 2008).   
 
Internal competition Rulers face challenges to their tenure either via competitive 
elections, or alternatively via insurrections or coups. Rulers are more likely to face a 
challenge if they are perceived to govern poorly. What potential challengers consider 
to be adequate governance is influenced by what they see happening in other 
countries. As in theories of yardstick competition in economics, the precise standard 
of comparison will be influenced by performance in neighboring states (Besley & 
Case, 1995; Baybeck, Berry, & Siegel, 2011). In contrast, improved performance on 
governance should increase rulers’ legitimacy and support, and reduce the probability 
of a leadership challenge.  
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Not only the perception of potential challengers (or political entrepreneurs) matters 
but also of the population at large. For the latter, performance matters not only in 
absolute but also in relative terms: the evaluation of citizens will be based, at least 
partly, on how comparator states are governed. However, for most citizens it is not 
rational to acquire detailed information on national governing performance over and 
beyond what can be obtained through everyday experience. Performance is a public 
good, and individual citizens are unlikely to be able to influence levels of provision 
through gathering information. So citizens make crude judgments using limited 
information where any knowledge about how neighboring countries are performing 
will be particularly useful. Information about neighboring countries is easier to obtain, 
because people are more likely to experience them through travel, work or personal 
contacts, and by means of coverage of regional news.1 Further, information about 
neighboring countries will be much easier to interpret and to relate to personal 
experience. Performance in neighboring states thus sets a standard of comparison. The 
net benefits of good performance in one’s own country will be lower, if neighboring 
countries have a higher level of performance. In this respect, the aim of the WGI to 
measure and communicate perceptions of governance is particularly relevant.  
 
External competition The possible impact of governance performance, and in 
particular control of corruption, on the willingness of donors to provide aid has 
received a lot of attention. Notably, Dietrich interviewed donor officials who 
suggested that the WGI serve as a primary source for cross-country governance 
measures.2 Winters & Martinez (2015: 518) observe that “studies of governance tend 
to find that poor governance negatively predicts overall aid flows”, but also note that 
these findings do not apply uniformly. Sensitivity to poor governance varies across 
 12
donor countries where some of them actually give more aid to more corrupt countries 
(Alesina & Weder, 2002). Donors that care more about governance still give aid to 
poorly governed countries, but prefer to use types of aid over which they retain more 
control (Winters & Martinez, 2013; Clist, Isopi, & Morrissey, 2012). Dietrich (2013; 
n.d.) finds that donors tend to by-pass official government channels in poorly 
governed countries. Governance has also affected aid allocation criteria (Claessens, 
Cassimon, & van Campenhout, 2009), and the willingness of donors to provide debt 
relief (Freytag & Pehnelt, 2009). Barthel et al. (2014) observe spatial dependence in 
aid allocation among donor countries driven by competition for export markets, but 
we are not aware of any studies of spatial dependence among receiving countries. 
 
Arguably of particular importance for rulers of poor developing countries is the 
competition for foreign direct investment and overseas aid. Competition could lead to 
similar performance, and clustering could be due to neighboring countries being 
competitors (Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons 2007; Cao 2012). Not only is quality of 
governance relevant for investors and donors, it is also plausible that they are aware 
of the information provided by the WB (or the various sources on which the WGI 
rely). Investors and donors look for a stable political environment and low levels of 
corruption among other considerations, such as foreign policy goals, strategic ties, 
access to raw materials, size of market, nature of the workforce, or historical ties to 
donors and investors.  Resources are more likely to flow to a higher performing 
country when donors and investors compare two potential target countries, at least if 
the countries are sufficiently similar in all other relevant respects.  
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Private investors seek to invest in countries with higher returns, and obviously look 
for investment opportunities in their line of activity. It is plausible that, all things 
being equal, returns increase with the performance of states on governance indicators; 
for instance, corruption will be lower and investments less subject to expropriation.3 
Investors also have incentives to seek out some information on the performance of 
any pair of countries they consider investing in, because the returns for being better 
informed are private goods for them. The WGI are publicly available and there is 
some evidence that investors take them into consideration.4 Using the WGI, 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) find the FDI is greater in developing 
countries that have good governance, although it may also crowd out domestic private 
investment in these countries. Kurtz & Schrank (2007), however, question the 
importance the World Bank, IMF and some other international organizations place on 
governance as an influence on foreign direct investment. Moreover, Asiedu (2002) 
finds that Sub-Sahara Africa may be unique in that higher return on investment and 
infrastructure do not seem to have an impact on FDI, and that the impact of trade 
openness is weaker there compared to the rest of the world. We accept that 
governance is unlikely to be the only consideration, but if two countries are equally 
attractive to an investor given its line of business, the one with the higher governance 
score will tend to attract investment that might have gone to the other. Supporting this 
assumption, Bloningen et al. (2007) observe that FDI into a host country depends on 
FDI in proximate countries, while Blanco (2012) finds that surrounding market 
potential, rather than spatial autocorrelation, explains FDI in Latin America; 
interestingly, he also finds that control of corruption promotes FDI.  
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Strategic Interaction in Networks and Governance Diffusion 
This section develops a governance performance game played by political leaders on 
the networks highlighted above. Success in the network of competition for foreign 
direction investment can be achieved by performing better on governance scores than 
competitors. Internal legitimacy is gained by performing well relative to comparator 
countries defined by the information network. However, any improvements in 
performance can also have political costs. They need to be funded through taxation or 
extraction. Improved governance may also reduce the availability of rents.  
 
Internal competition We assume that citizens make crude judgments using limited 
information. Information should come for free, or at relatively low costs. Let dij ≥ 0, 
dii = 0, denote how easy it is for citizens in country i to obtain information about 
country j’s governing performance. Personal contacts, for example by means of trade, 
or information picked up through coverage of regional news are the most likely 
source of easily accessible information. The costs for obtaining information should 
thus relate to geography and trade links. The most straightforward argument concerns 
geography: the further j is from i, the higher the costs of obtaining information about j 
and the less weight j will have in a composite index for performance comparison. 
Thus, we assume the index of comparison used by citizens of i to equal: ∑ ∀ , 
where   ∈ 0,∞ is j’s level of performance and j ≠ i. 
 
External competition We model external competition as a game played on a valued 
network where the network tie between units i and j, cij ≥ 0, cij = cji, cii = 0, represents 
the strength of competition for FDI and ODA. Suppose there is a set of characteristics 
governing attractiveness. These might include nearness to external markets, access to 
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raw materials, skills of the labor force, size and wealth of the market, transport links, 
etc. We can think of states being located at a point is the characteristic space. Then cij 
is a function of the reciprocal of the distance between the positions of states in this 
space. Distance in this sense measures a dyad’s structural similarity as investment 
locations (Cao, 2012).   
 
Accordingly, the utility function of the ruler of country i can be represented as 
follows:         (1) 
 = − ∀ +  −  ∀  
 
The first term represents payoffs to a ruler from external competition. We treat these 
payoffs as the numéraire relative to the first form of benefits and to costs. For a given 
degree of competition between countries i and j (given by cij) and pi > pj, country i 
expects differentially to attract inward investment that might otherwise have been 
located in country j. Country i expects to lose such investment if pi < pj. The larger the 
value of cij, the more governance performance differentials matter to whether the ruler 
of i attracts flows of inward investment that would otherwise have gone to country j.  
 
The second term relates to net gains from internal competition. First, we expect 
rulers’ marginal gains from good performance on governance indicators to be 
declining. As with any standard good, marginal utility of performance declines for 
citizens; hence marginal gains in support for rulers decline also. Moreover, there are 
political costs of governance, because taxation may have to increase as provision of 
infrastructural capital investment, education and health go up. Also, good governance 
decreases rents available to special interests through corrupt practices. The political 
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resistance of such groups can be expected to increase as governance scores are pushed 
higher. Allowing for costs, we expect domestic political gains to be a strictly concave 
function of performance. Therefore, in the second term: φi > 0; θi  > 0; and for 
sufficiently low levels of pi, φipi - θi pi2 > 0 and δUi/δ pi > 0. Secondly, we expect such 
gains to be lower the better the performance of comparator states.  Net benefits from 
good performance are lower the higher performance in comparator countries, hence Σ 
dijpj  is the divisor in the third term. 
 
Reaction functions  Assuming the ruler of country i does not choose the corner 
solution pi = 0, we can derive the best response from the first-order condition, because 
expression (1) is strictly concave in pi: 
(2) 
  = ∑ ∀ +  − 2 ∑ ∀⁄  = 0 
 
Re-arranging: 
(3) 
 =  !"#$∀ +% 2  
 
 
Here  !"#$ = ∑ is country i’s centrality in the valued competition network. The 
solution of the game has an intuitive interpretation: countries with higher centrality in 
the competition network can be seen as under more competitive pressure from other 
countries. Moreover the effects of centrality increase as a function of the term Σdijpj , 
the average performance level of other countries as perceived by the citizens of 
country i. Since  !"#$ , and dij > 0, i’s performance is an increasing function of j’s. 
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Thus the first term in equation (3) captures the interaction between external 
competition through the competition network and the desire for internal legitimacy 
driven by yardstick competition.  
 
Testing for causal mechanisms Suppose that terms dij increase as the distance 
between countries i and j gets larger, because it should be more difficult for citizens to 
find out about and meaningfully assess the performance of countries that are more 
distant. Then equation (3) signifies a spatial lag: the performance of country i is 
predicted to be a weighted average of the performance of other countries, where the 
weight on another country’s performance declines with distance (as well as being a 
function of centrality score). Assume unit homogeneity so that θi, and φi are the same 
across some relevant group of states. Then from expression (3), we can estimate the 
effects of external competition for inward investment using a linear statistical model 
including spatial lags.5 Specifically: a significant positive spatial lag coefficient on 
 !"#$ ∑ ∀  in equation (3)) suggests that external competitive pressures are 
important.  
 
 
Data and Research Design 
Estimation We estimate spatio-temporal autoregressive models (Franzese & Hays, 
2008) of the form 
 
                                                      pt = α + τpt-1 + Xt-1β + ρWpt 
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where p is an  vector of observations of governance performance, for N = 47 
African states for = 13 periods. We focus on Africa partly because we think it is 
more likely that unit homogeneity is satisfied in a single region and because Africa 
has been a particular focus for the link between governance and development for 
international organizations. Microstates with populations under 1 million are 
excluded.6 The observations on performance from 1996 to 2002 are biannual; from 
2003 to 2011 the observations are annual. X is a battery of controls characterizing 
individual states, including network centrality scores suggested by the model, to be 
discussed shortly. The connectivity matrix, W, is a N’(T-1) by N’(T-1) block-diagonal 
matrix with (T-1) N’XN’ sub-matrices along the leading diagonal, and typical non-
zero element wijt  capturing relative connectivity or influence from unit j to i at time t.7 
The first year of observations is lost because of the inclusion of the temporal lag, 
hence T-1. There is some further missing data on the controls, hence N’ < N.  
 
The estimate of ρ is the spatial lag coefficient that captures the strength of policy 
interdependence. The models include a temporal lag both because we expect path 
dependence in policies affecting governing performance and because of high levels of 
temporal autocorrelation in the residuals of models estimated without the temporal lag 
τ. Maximum likelihood estimation avoids simultaneity bias due to including the 
dependent variable on both sides of the equation (Anselin, 1988; Franzese & Hays, 
2008).  
 
Governance The WGI are based on perceptions of governance relating to the 
selection of political leaders, and the effectiveness of and respect for their rule. 
Accordingly, the WGI provide six aggregates. ‘Voice and accountability’ covers 
1NT ×
T
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democracy and political freedoms. ‘Political stability/absence of violence’ takes in 
perceptions of unconstitutional or violent threats to governments. ‘Government 
effectiveness’ covers the quality of public services and servants. ‘Regulatory quality’ 
concerns whether policies promote or hinder markets. As indices of respect for 
institutions and rules, ‘Rule of law’ captures the extent to which government agents 
abide by the rules of society, and ‘control of corruption’ the extent to which public 
power is used for private gain. Each indicator combines information from a large 
number of sources using an unobserved-components model, based on the assumption 
that indicators are a linear function of some unobserved concept plus an error. 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) argue that this method averages out idiosyncratic features of 
particular sources of data while also allowing them to provide standard errors for each 
indicator.  
 
The WGI are used extensively in academic research. Winters and Martinez (2014: 
517-8) survey 19 studies that examine governance as determinant of foreign aid and 
find that eight use the WGI. The most commonly used alternatives are the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is a source in the WGI, and the 
Freedom House scores. They also note that many studies either rely on specific 
indicators, such as corruption control or government effectiveness, or use the average 
over a subset of indicators. Consequently, our empirical analysis below considers 
spatial diffusion for five of the six dimensions of governance separately.8 Some 
alternative governance indicators may have more public exposure, but they cannot 
match the comprehensive scope of the WGI; in effect, they have become the ‘industry 
standard’ (see also, Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
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Distance Contiguity and the reciprocal of distance are standard ways to 
operationalize purely geographical spatial effects, and helpful to capture the idea that 
citizens pay more attention to performance in states that are nearby. We have tried 
both approaches but generally found weaker effects with respect to contiguity (not 
reported). We use Gleditsch and Ward’s (2001) data on the distance between capital 
cities. For our purposes, this is the most relevant measure of distance because capital 
cities tend to be the largest centers of population, and rulers have to pay special 
attention to popular legitimacy in them (Bates, 2005). Accordingly, for each dyad we 
define9   
rec_distij = 1/(1 + distance between capitals)  
 
Competition Competition for external resources between members of a dyad should 
be high if they are (a) geographically close to each other and (b) similarly attractive to 
foreign investors. 10 Geographical closeness controls for aspects such as nearness to 
raw materials, markets, and transport costs. When other factors, such as labor costs, 
that make a country attractive for foreign investors are similar and the countries are 
nearby, it is more likely that good governance will indeed tip the balance in making 
investment decisions.  
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) reports competitiveness scores for individual 
countries (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2013). Scores rest on standard internationally 
comparable data from organizations such as the WB and also on expert judgments. 
There are four ‘basic requirements’ resting on twelve ‘pillars’ of competitiveness. As 
we are attempting to capture aspects of competiveness that do not relate to current 
governance performance, we cannot include pillars such as institutions or health and 
 21
primary education. Instead, we focused on infrastructure (listed among the basic 
requirements) and market size (listed among efficiency enhancing pillars). Given 
African countries’ stage of economic development, the WEF suggest that 
infrastructure should weight roughly twice as much as market size, and the scores are 
weighted accordingly. A drawback is that scores for African countries are only 
available for the years after 2006.  However, it is possible to fit a very simple 
predictive model that explained around 68% of the variance in the scores across these 
cases – a quadratic in real GDP per capita in year 2000 $.11 We used the estimated 
coefficients from this model and values of GDPpc to calculate monadic 
competiveness scores index_compit for all cases, including those for which data were 
actually available, to ensure consistency.  
 
The measure of dyadic competition corresponding to the parameter cij in the 
theoretical model becomes: 
compijt  =  rec_distij * (1/(1 + |index_compit – index_compjt|). 
Competition between two countries is higher if they are closer together (captured by 
the first term) and they are similarly competitive with regard to their infrastructure 
quality and market size (captured by the second term). However, the model suggests 
that what matters to performance is actually a country’s degree centrality in the 
competitiveness network. Taking account of time, this is defined as follows: 
 &!"#$ ='(&∀  
Competition centrality in a given year is, thus, a measure of the overall pressure a 
country is under in its competition for external resources, in particular, FDI.  
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The theory—to be precise, the first term in equation (3)—suggests that spatial lags, 
interacting distance and centrality in the competition network, are needed. 
Accordingly we define a spatial weight matrix compXrec_dist_w where for non-zero 
cells: 
'()*+_-.& =  &!"#$ ∗ *+_-. 
It is common practice to row-standardize spatial weighting matrices (that is, to divide 
entries by row totals) as this makes interpretation of results somewhat more 
straightforward. However the decision on whether to do this or not should ideally be 
led by theory (Plümper & Neumayer, 2010). Here row-standardizing corresponds to 
the idea that citizens of all states have a fixed total amount of attention to allocate to 
other states’ performance, allocating within this total in inverse proportion to distance. 
Not row-standardizing corresponds to the idea that citizens of states generally located 
further away from neighbors allocate less attention in total than those that generally 
have close neighbors. This seems to make more sense when information is costly; so 
we do not row-standardize.12 
 
Controls The degree to which countries are embedded in the IGO network affects 
their exposure to the governance scores of other countries. The Correlates of War 
Project Inter-Governmental Organization Data version 2.3 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, & 
Warnke, 2004) measures the number of IGOs to which both members of a dyad are 
affiliated, igoijt. Since the data only runs up to 2005, we linearly extrapolated them to 
2011. This is justifiable both because dyadic scores are very slow moving year-by-
year and because there is a general upward trend in IGO membership and the number 
of IGOs. The degree centrality of country i in the IGO network at time t becomes 
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 &01" = ∑ 2'&∀ . The theory suggests that states with higher centrality scores 
should have better governance performance.  
 
The idea that political decentralization improves government performance has been of 
considerable interest to the World Bank, leading to a major effort to develop 
indicators (Ivanyna & Shah, 2012). Some hold that decentralization leads to greater 
citizen control and accountability of politicians, increased transparency and lower 
corruption, less burdensome bureaucracy and a better fit between demand and supply 
of public services. In a federal system competition between units, due to possibilities 
for exit by citizens and investment in other states in the federation, may also improve 
performance. On the other hand, decentralization can lead to clientelism at local level, 
and weakened national political parties and cooperation across units; and in practice 
power may not really be decentralized in nominally federal systems (Weingast, 2014). 
The empirical evidence from studies of the relation between decentralization and 
particular performance indicators on economic development, health and education is 
ambiguous (Faguet, 2014: 10). Nevertheless the theory might still apply to 
governance, and some work has been done to test it using case studies and within-
country variance in governance (see Faguet (2014) for a survey of studies in a special 
issue of World Development). Generally the WB’s indicators of political 
decentralization in Africa have somewhat wider coverage than its indicators of fiscal 
decentralization. Accordingly, we use its coding for federation, a dummy variable 
taking on the value 1 if the system is federal. Decentralization can be related to the 
average area covered by lower-tier units of government. We also use the number of 
second-tier political units divided by the country’s land area as a decentralization 
measure.  
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The WGI cover a wide spectrum of types of performance. Lacking strong theoretical 
models for each of the indicators, the models also include a set of generic controls. 
Firstly, they include GDP per capita and its squared term. Wealthier countries are 
expected to perform better but with decreasing marginal returns. The models further 
include centrality in the competitiveness network as a control, because in the spatial 
lags the variable interacts with distance making it appropriate to include it. Moreover, 
the theory suggests that if internal legitimacy does not matter to rulers, performance 
should be a function of centrality in the competition network.13 Net overseas 
development aid as a percentage of total GDP is included, because such aid may be 
aimed at improving governance. Preliminary work suggests that rural population as a 
percentage of total population tends to correlate positively and significantly with 
governance performance. We are not sure whether this reflects any causal process, 
however. Since each of our control variables may be endogenous to performance—
though results in relation to our theory do not seem sensitive to this—we lagged each 
of these variables by one year in an attempt to address this issue. 
 
The models include two time-invariant controls. The first is Fearon’s (2003) data on 
ethnic fractionalization, and the second is the absolute value of the average latitude of 
the country reflecting its distance from the equator. Both controls are clearly 
exogenous, but the direction of their impact on governance is disputed. 
Fractionalization correlates positively with some aspects of performance. Latitude 
captures any colonial legacy possibly associated with higher governance scores on 
some measures (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). 
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Results 
Table 1 summarizes the findings for five different WGI governance indicators. Each 
model includes as a spatial weight matrix the interaction between centrality in the 
competition network and reciprocal of distance. The theoretical expectation is that the 
relevant spatial autocorrelation coefficients (ρ) are positive and significant. We note 
that the correlations between the various control variables as well as the correlations 
between the controls and the spatial weights are modest ( < .6). The reported 
coefficients on controls actually only capture instantaneous effects, not equilibrium 
effects. 
                                                    (Table 1 about here) 
 
The WGI score for ‘voice and accountability’ is the dependent variable of the first 
model of Table 1. The positive and significant spatial autocorrelation provides quite 
strong evidence that competition for external resources matters. Further, the lagged 
values of centrality in the competition network are also significant, though the 
coefficient for (lagged) centrality in the IGO network is clearly insignificant. 
 
The results for the other control variables are largely as expected. The lagged 
dependent variable is highly significant. Wealthier countries are more likely to have 
high scores but with decreasing marginal effects. Overseas development aid appears 
to promote voice and accountability. Possibly more surprising is that the coefficients 
for ethnic fractionalization and larger share of rural population are positive. There is 
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some evidence for the idea that scores are higher in parts of Africa further from the 
equator, though latitude is only marginally significant. Since ethnic fractionalization 
and latitude are only significant in the models for ‘voice and accountability’, our 
findings clearly provide little support for the suggested link between colonial heritage 
and governance (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2001). Finally, neither measure of 
decentralization is significant.    
 
The second and third model in Table 1 report respectively on government 
effectiveness, the quality of public services and servants, and regulatory quality, the 
extent to which policies promote or hinder markets. Very few variables are significant 
in both models with exception of the lagged dependent variable and (marginally for 
government effectiveness) decentralization. The latter suggests that decentralization 
may indeed have a positive impact on the quality of public service. In the second 
model for government effectiveness, wealth is also significant as is, again marginally, 
rural population. Ethnic fractionalization is not significant, suggesting that power-
sharing arrangements may indeed contribute to higher scores on ‘voice and 
accountability’ while not necessarily improving the quality of public service.  
 
Importantly, there is little indication that network ties matter for government 
effectiveness or regulatory quality. The spatial lags for competitiveness weighted by 
distance is insignificant in both models with a p-value of less than 0.15. The controls 
for centrality in the competitiveness network and the IGO network do not reach 
significance either. Finally, the coefficients for ODA are insignificant and 
inconsistent. Clearly, we do not find evidence for the spatial diffusion of, or external 
pressures for, government effectiveness and regulatory quality. Even though 
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government effectiveness and regulatory control would appear to be based on political 
decisions to invest in bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency, and in contrast to the 
literature emphasizing the diffusion of economic liberalization (Simmons, Dobbin & 
Garrett 2008; Graham, Shipan & Volden 2013), we are unable to find clear evidence 
for the spatial diffusion of best practices on the governance dimensions that are most 
closely related. 
 
In Table 1, Model 4 reports on ‘rule of law’ and Model 5 on ‘control of corruption’. 
For both indices we find evidence that spatial correlation matters: the spatial lag on 
competition is significant at the 95% level in the model for rule of law, while the p-
value of the spatial lag equals 0.07 (and thus is significant at the 93% level) in the 
control of corruption model. In both models, centrality in the competition network is 
significant at the 90% level, but IGO centrality is insignificant. Overall, these findings 
still suggest that the scores for ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’ are driven 
externally—via the competition for inward investment. Some further support for this 
suggestion can be found in the control variables. Apart from the lagged dependent 
variables and wealth (which are always significant), overseas aid (ODA) is positively 
linked with the upholding the rule of law. External donors seem indeed increasingly 
concerned with rule of law (and human rights). Aid is, however, not significant for 
control of corruption. Federalism and decentralization are not significant for rule of 
law and control of corruption either.  
 
To summarize, we find evidence for spatial diffusion of democracy, rule of law, and 
corruption control. There is no evidence for diffusion of regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. 
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Robustness Structural equivalence is a possible alternative approach to capture 
competition between a pair of countries; countries are structurally equivalent if there 
is a high, positive bivariate correlation between vectors of characteristics that are 
considered relevant for competition (Cao & Ward, 2014). Members of a dyad with a 
high, positive correlation are said to be in a structurally equivalent position, hence 
they are under similar competitive pressure (Cao, 2012). Accordingly, we calculate 
structural equivalence using data from the African Development Indicators database, 
relying as much as possible on indicators that can be considered exogenous to 
governance. Replacing the spatial lags based on centrality in the competitiveness 
network weighted by distance with spatial lags based on structural equivalence, we 
find that the ρ values are typically not significant at conventional levels. Including 
alternative spatial lags has however little impact on the coefficients for the controls. 
 
A classic liberal argument is that trade between countries increases awareness, both 
because some citizens have a greater incentive to find out about conditions in the 
other country and because trade is often accompanied by travel by citizens. Arguably, 
geographical distance between two countries is then not necessarily a good indicator 
of how much information citizens have about governance in the other country.14 
Accordingly, we generated a spatial weighting matrix based on data for total bilateral 
trade flows between countries in constant dollars (Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2009) 
and used this in the models of Table 1 as an alternative spatial lag. Again, none of the 
coefficients on spatial lags based on bilateral trade is significant at conventional 
levels, but the coefficients for the controls were unaffected. 
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The models in Table 1 address possible endogeneity by lagging the independent 
variable by one period. As a (more demanding) alternative, we have re-run the models 
using a five period lag on all temporally varying control variables apart from the 
lagged dependent variable. The direction of the effects (both of the controls and the 
spatial lags) was unaffected. The findings on the spatial lags are similar apart for the 
spatial lag in the model for control of corruption. In this case, the spatial lag is not 
quite significant at the 90% level anymore. There is little change in results for 
controls from those reported in text, and in few instance the findings are actually 
marginally stronger when using a five period lag. 
 
Finally, the models in Table 1 are estimated separately even though they could be 
considered related. As an alternative specification, we implanted GLM with 
seemingly unrelated regressions using spatial lags. The key results remain robust with 
similarly signed coefficients and significance levels and only marginal differences in 
the size of some coefficients.15 
 
Conclusions 
The quality of governance has become prominent in debates on underdevelopment 
with clear and obvious implications for policy: rulers of ‘poor’ countries have their 
own responsibilities to ‘deserve’ their internal legitimacy and external attention. A lot 
of attention has been given to pressures for political and economic liberalization 
mainly from ‘western’ developed countries and the institutions they control, and less 
to the impact of regional developments. In this respect, the World Bank WGI 
indicators have been criticized for functioning as headline figures (Kurtz & Schrank 
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2007; Andrews 2008; Kelley & Simmons, 2015). We contribute to these debates in 
three ways. 
 
First of all, we present a model in which governance follows from political decisions. 
The theory recognizes the relevance of information and competition for scarce 
resources. However, even though inward investment generally comes from faraway 
places (the West and China), the main focus of the competition is regional. External 
sponsors decide to give aid (or to invest) in one country rather than another, where the 
‘other country’ is often a neighboring one. Similarly, internal legitimacy will depend 
more on comparison with countries nearby than with countries faraway: for citizens of 
Libya, the relevant country of comparison is Egypt or Tunisia rather than Germany, 
the UK or the USA. 
 
The second contribution is that our empirical models control not only for spatial 
linkages and/or the position (or centrality) of countries in competition and information 
networks (Simmons & Elkins, 2004) but also for spatial linkages conditional on the 
same competition and information networks. Importantly, the specification follows 
directly from our theoretical framework. We recognize, however, that the results 
reported only capture instantaneous and not necessarily equilibrium effects.  
 
Finally, even though we acknowledge that the strength of our findings is mixed, there 
is evidence for diffusion for some of the WGI indicators, specifically voice and 
accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption. There is no evidence for such 
effects in relation to government effectiveness and regulatory quality. Selecting from 
the various attempts to increase awareness of the quality of governance, we decided to 
 31
focus on the WB WGI because they are the most comprehensive and consistent. The 
development and publication of these governance indicators may well have had a 
positive impact in some dimensions. At least, we find some, competition-driven, 
diffusion of the quality of governance, which may be based on either the World Bank 
governance indicators directly or on the perception of underlying levels of 
performance captured by the WGI. Competitive pressures from other countries’ 
performance seem, however, to have no impact on quality of government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. These areas are definitely of concern to the WB 
and the focus of governance in the economic literature (Simmons, Dobbins, & 
Garrett, 2008).  
 
There are several possible explanations, none of which we find entirely satisfactory. It 
may be that institutional and legal frameworks are easier to address compared to 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality. Improving the quality of 
government officials is quite costly, and lack of regulatory quality presents 
opportunities for rent seeking. Alternatively, compared to the other dimensions of 
governance, political leaders may care less about perceived lack of government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. Possibly, African political leaders consider 
especially these dimensions of governance as externally contrived and less applicable 
to local conditions. A final possibility is that the quality of data is particularly poor in 
these areas. Of course, the data quality of all governance indicators for Africa remains 
a reason for concern, and the WGI acknowledge the uncertainties surrounding their 
estimates. Control of corruption and democratization seem, however, to have been 
more salient than the general quality of government officials and regulations. If so, 
 32
the WGI may reflect more accurately perceptions of the former dimensions compared 
to the latter.   
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Table 1. Spatial Correlations (Competitiveness and Distance Weighted) of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Y Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivenes 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
Τ Y (lagged) 0.926 0.933 0.934 0.931 0.894 
  (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.013)*** (0.018)*** 
Β GDP pc (lagged) -6.77e-05 5.3e-05 3.46e-05 6.6e05 7.29e-05 
  (2.78e-05)* (2.21e-05)* (2.79e-05) (2.11e-05)** (2.66e-
05)** 
 GDP pc (lagged,  -7.18e09 -6.42e-09 -3.42e-09 -7.10e-09 -8.99e-09 
 squared) (3.58e-09)* (2.84e-09)* (3.44e-09) (2.67e-09)** (3.41e-
09)** 
 Competitiveness  6.258 1.726 1.914 2.604 3.472 
 (centrality, lagged) (2.066)** (1.552) (1.787) (1.536)+ (1.909)+ 
 IGO network 7.04e-06 -1.53e-06 1.84e-06 -1.43e-05 -1.79e-05 
 (centrality, lagged) (1.7e-05) (1.28e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.27e-05) (1.57e-05) 
 ODA (lagged) 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001)* (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)* (0.001) 
 Rural Population  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (lagged) (0.001)+ (0.001)+ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Ethnic  0.096 -0.038 0.026 0.017 -0.017 
 Fractionalization (0.049)* (0.033) (0.041) (0.034) (0.042) 
 Latitude (absolute) 0.003 -3.12e-04 2.70e-04 -4.62e-05 3.31e-04 
  (0.001)+ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (13.44e-
04) 
 Federation -0.022 0.012 -0.002 -0.014 -0.019 
  (0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.028) 
 Decentralization 8.821 10.419 13.836 4.128 8.162 
  (7.253) (5.411)+ (6.319)* (5.379) (6.725) 
 Constant -0.414 -0.159 -0.160 -0.170 -0.183 
  (0.126)*** (0.090)+ (0.117) (0.091)+ (0.111)+ 
Ρ Competitveness (centr) 3.278 1.154 1.406 1.726 2.099 
 * Distance Weighted (1.137)** (0.799) (0.957) (0.778)* (1.155)+ 
Σ  0.175 0.132 0.154 0.130 0.164 
  (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Chi2  7,407.12 9,288.50 7,158.88 11,073.93 5,137.03 
N  545 545 545 545 545 
Note: Statistically significant at: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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1
 News coverage does not always reflect geographical distance, and ‘world news’ 
pays more attention to the rich, developed countries. Citizens may, however, be more 
attentive to local news and will definitely find it easy to put such news in its proper 
context.  
2
 Personal correspondence, January 23 2015. 
3
 Investors might be concerned about the costs of good governance, but we assume 
they seldom are held liable for significant amounts of tax in countries they invest in. 
4
 The governance indicators compiled by Mo Ibrahim Foundation focus on Africa and 
are presumably read by the business community, see: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/10/african-governance (accessed 
January 30, 2015), and http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org  (accessed January 30, 
2015). A further alternative is the corruption perception index published by 
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org (accessed January 30, 2015).  
5
 We can only to estimate key parameters relative to θ; but we can make inferences 
about the direction of other effects if we are willing to assume θ  > 0. If  θ < 0, the 
legitimacy gains from better performance would not be concave, which is 
implausible. 
6
 We exclude Cape Verde, Seychelles, Sao Tome, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea and 
Djibouti from those nations that the World Bank includes in its database on Africa.  
7
 Weighting matrices have entries of zero along the leading diagonal and for cells not 
in blocks along the diagonal. To save unnecessary repetition we only define non-zero 
cells in the text. 
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8
 We do not report of political stability/absence of violence because the diffusion 
dynamics specified in our theory are less clearly applicable to this particular 
dimension of governance. The empirical model was also a very poor fit. 
9
 Gleditsch and Ward (2001) code the distance between Kinshasa and Brazzaville as 
zero. Internet sources give travel distances in the range 8-12 kilometres including 
ferry crossing. Reported results assume the distance is 8 kilometres. They do not seem 
sensitive to recoding (not reported). 
10
 The operationalization primarily follows the logic for competition for FDI, but we 
expect a similar logic to apply to ODA. 
11
 Like other variables for which we do not give an explicit data source, GDPpc was 
drawn from the World Bank’s African Development Indicators. Data was only 
available up to 2010, so we linearly interpolated 2011 values. Data for Somalia on 
GDPpc was missing for some years from World Bank data, so we used data from 
Penn World Tables. Fitting the model on a total of 120 observations gives an adjusted 
R2 of 0.67, F(2, 117) = 123.00 (p < 0.001), and with highly significant (p < 0.001) 
coefficients for GDPpc and GDPpc squared. 
12
 Results (not reported) were generally weaker after row standardizing. 
13
 If legitimacy does not matter the second term of expression (1) equals zero. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to pi leaves centrality terms in the competition 
network ( 3456) on the right-hand side. 
14
 We are not necessarily convinced by this argument; even though citizens may have 
acquired more information about China because of increased trade, for most people 
(at least outside Asia) China is still a very distant country about which they know very 
little. 
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15
 Results not reported by available upon request from the authors. 
